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1  Introduction 
Research on the macroeconomics of exchange rate regimes has tended to focus on issues 
of growth, inflation and stabilization (for example, Bailliu et al, 2003; Ghosh et al, 2003; 
and Husain et al, 2005). Much less attention has been paid to whether the choice of 
exchange rate regime matters for the volume of trade between countries.  An exception is 
the recent line of research, ignited by a provocative paper by Andrew Rose in 2000, that 
has focussed on the contribution of currency unions in promoting trade.  Rose’s initial 
finding that membership of a currency union appears to have a very large positive effect 
on trade between countries – boosting trade by as much as 200 percent, ceteris paribus, 
according to his central point estimates – has provided a major stimulus to empirical and 
theoretical  work  on  gravity  models  of  trade.  Most  of  this  has  been  concerned  with 
‘shrinking’ the size of Rose’s initial estimates of the currency union effect which many 
researchers found implausible. Rose himself has offered further empirical work in the 
area (notably Rose, 2001; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Glick and Rose, 2002), while 
the specific effect of currency union in Europe has been investigated by Barr, Breedon 
and  Miles  (2003)  and  Micco,  Stein  and  Ordoñez  (2003).  Baldwin  (2005)  provides  a 
useful  critical  survey  of  the  empirical  literature  and  a  review  of  the  theoretical 
developments.   
   
Currency unions represent only one possible exchange rate regime, however.  In this 
paper we address the more general question: to what extent do exchange rate regimes 
other than currency unions affect trade volumes?  We present what we think are the first 
comprehensive estimates of the effect on trade between pairs of countries of a full menu   2 
of different exchange rate regimes.
1  Using a large panel dataset which combines the 
Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2003b)  data  on  de  facto  exchange  rate  regimes  with  the  data 
collected  by  Rose  (2003)
2,  we  estimate  a  ‘new  version’  gravity  model  in  which  we 
identify the effect on the trade between pairs of countries of a wide range of bilateral 
exchange rate regimes, from membership of the same or of different currency unions, 
through pegging to the same or different anchor currencies, to managed floats and full 
floats.  We  find  that  exchange  rate  regimes  which  reduce  exchange  rate  risk  and 
transactions costs, including currency unions, do indeed have positive effects on trade, 
but  we  also  obtain  results  which  suggest  that  currency  union  membership  and  other 
arrangements have significant effects on the trade of third party countries. Our results 
enable  us  to  produce  a  trade-weighted  tariff-equivalent  estimate  of  the  full  monetary 
barrier which is comparable to that found by Rose and van Wincoop (2001), together 
with  estimates  of  the  tariff-equivalent  barriers  associated  with  other  exchange  rate 
regimes. 
   
In section 2 we explain our basic methodology, which involves the estimation of what 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) call the ‘new’ version of the gravity model, together 
with a treatment of distance which draws on Mélitz (2003, 2005). In section 3 we set out 
the  methodology  and  data  used  to  supplement  this  model  with  a  specification  of the 
exchange rate regimes between country pairs. In section 4 we present estimates of the 
effects on trade of the full menu of regimes over the period from 1973 to 1998. Section 5 
uses  the  results  to  calculate  the  tariff-equivalent  effects  of  different  exchange  rate 
regimes. Section 6 concludes.   3 
 
2  Basic methodology 
The original work on currency unions in gravity models, such as Rose (2000) and Frankel 
and Rose (2002), used what Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004) have called the 
‘empirical’ or ‘traditional’ version of the gravity model. Because of concerns that the 
extremely high estimates of the currency union effect on trade flows emerging from this 
approach reflected fundamental misspecification errors in the estimated gravity equation, 
recent work in this area, including by Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Mélitz (2003), 
has returned to the trade-theoretic framework for the gravity model originally proposed 
by  Anderson  (1979).   The  key  insight  of  this  ‘theoretical’  or ‘new’  approach  is  that 
bilateral trade between countries i and j depends heavily on the ratio of ‘bilateral trade 
resistance’ to ‘multilateral trade resistance’, that is on the ratio of the barriers to trade 
between countries i and j to the barriers which each of i and j face in their trade with all 
their trading partners (including domestic or internal trade). In other words trade between, 
say, France and Italy depends on how costly it is for each to trade with the other relative 
to the costs involved for each of them in trading with other countries. A reduction in the 
bilateral  trade  barrier  between  France  and  the  UK  would  therefore  reduce  France’s 
multilateral trade resistance and (given the size of its trade barrier with Italy) reduce 
French trade with Italy, as well increasing the trade between France and the UK. This 
innovation introduces an obviously sensible substitutability between trade with different 
partners which was missing from the traditional formulation, and in doing so provides a 
natural way of understanding how exchange rate regimes impact on trade patterns.  
     4 
More precisely, in the simple case where each country specialises in the production of a 






















T                (1) 
where Tij is the flow of trade between country i and country j,
3 yi and yj are the respective 
GDPs, y
W is global GDP, tij is the bilateral trade resistance expressed as the trade cost 
factor which relates the prices paid by the consumer in one country to the price received 
by the producer in the other (and where equation (1) assumes symmetry in trade costs so 
that tij= tji), ￿ is the constant elasticity of substitution between all goods (assumed to be 
greater than  one  so  that  there is a  negative  effect  from  bilateral  trade  costs  on trade 
flows), and Pi and Pj are the respective CES consumer price indices for each country. The 
latter terms  show the  extent  to  which  trade  costs  raise  prices of  goods in  general  to 
consumers  in  one  country  above  the  price  received  by  firms  in  that  and  all  other 
countries, and are denoted ‘multilateral trade resistance’.
4 They depend on all the trade 
cost factors for each country’s trade with itself and all other countries, and take the form 
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where pi is the price received by exporters in country i and bi is the distribution parameter 
in the utility function.
5 Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) derive comparable results for 
a model in which each country produces a product within each product class. 
   5 
The trade cost factors can in turn be regarded as functions of a group of continuous 
variables (see Mélitz, 2003), notably some measure of distance, on the one hand, and 
population and land area (reflecting the ease of domestic rather than international trade) 
on the other; and a group of categorical variables covering, for example, whether two 
countries have a common border, the nature of their prior and existing colonial relations, 
and  whether  they  have  some  particular  trade  arrangement  or  exchange  rate  regime 
between them. 
   
Empirical estimation of this model has to take account of the fact that Pi and Pj are not 
observable. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) directly solve for Pi and Pj in terms of the 
observable determinants of the trade barrier and then estimate (1) directly using non-
linear estimation techniques. An alternative, adopted by Rose and van Wincoop (2001) 
and Mélitz (2003) and used in this paper, is to include country fixed effects in a standard 
regression as proxies for multilateral trade resistance. The country fixed effects capture 
the common element in each country’s trade with every other country, which is precisely 
the notion of multilateral trade resistance.
6 
   
The issue of distance has been investigated in more detail by Mélitz (2003, 2005), who 
has argued that distance is better measured as the distance between each country’s most 
populous city (as the centre of gravity for economic activity), rather than as the distance 
between the geographic centres of each country as in Rose’s work. Across the sample as 
a whole this modification makes little difference, but there are obvious cases where it 
does.  In Canada, for example, economic activity is concentrated close to the border with   6 
the US while the geographic centre is much further north, and in a number of Middle 
Eastern  and  African  countries  the  geographic  centre  is  determined  by  large  areas  of 
economically empty desert while economic activity is concentrated on the shores of a sea 
or a river. Mélitz (2003) also argued, in line with the Anderson-van Wincoop emphasis 
on  bilateral  versus  multilateral  trade  resistance,  that  what  matters  is  not  absolute but 
relative  distance,  that  is,  the  distance  between  two  countries  relative  to  the  average 
distance between each of them and all their trading partners. An obvious example of the 
importance of this is New Zealand, which is, as Baldwin (2005) points out, a long way 
from Australia but an even longer way from other industrialised countries. However, as 
Mélitz (2005) makes clear, once country fixed effects are included, the average distance 
or remoteness of a country is subsumed in those fixed effects, and distance is in effect 
relative distance.  
   
With the exception of Mélitz’s distance measures and our own classification of exchange 
rate regimes (see below), we rely exclusively on data provided by Rose (2003).
7 These 
consist of annual data from 1948 to 1999 for  175 countries. In that paper Rose was 
concerned primarily with assessing the impact on trade between countries of membership 
of the WTO (GATT), the IMF and the OECD, but his previous finding on the role of 
currency union membership comes through strongly.    In this paper we focus on the post-
Bretton  Woods era from 1973 to 1998, only.  For  much of the earlier part of Rose’s 
sample, many developing countries – particularly those in Africa and the Caribbean --  
were still colonies whose exchange rate regimes were imposed by their colonial masters. 
The currency unions and hard peg regimes that proliferated under such arrangements   7 
were  also  associated  with  relatively  low  tariff  barriers  as  the  result  of  systems  of 
‘imperial preference’. In addition, the post-1973 period involved much more change over 
time in individual countries’ exchange rate regimes than the Bretton Woods period. The 
pre-1973 period therefore provides a much less suitable field for testing the effect of 
exchange rate regimes on trade than the later years when former colonies had become 
free to choose their own regime and tariffs and where non-tariff barriers generally were 
much lower. We also exclude 1999 because, given the evidence from Micco, Ordoñez 
and Stein (2003) that the impact on trade of European monetary union is gradual, we 
want to exclude the incomplete effect of the first year of that development.
8 
   
Our full estimating equation, defined for country-pair-years, is: 
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where i and j denote the two trading partners 
t denotes time 
X is the average value of real bilateral trade (constant US dollars)  
Y is real GDP (constant US dollars) 
Pop is the population of the country 
D is the great circle distance between most populous cities (standard miles) 
Area is the area of the country (square kilometres) 
Lang is a dummy with value 1 if the two countries have the same language, and 0 
otherwise   8 
ComBord is a dummy variable with value 1 if the two countries have a common 
border 
Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the pair (0, 1 or 2) 
Island is the number of countries in the pair which are islands (0, 1 or 2) 
ComCol is a dummy with value 1 if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with 
same coloniser, and 0 otherwise 
Colony is a dummy with value 1 if i ever colonised j or vice versa 
CurCol is a dummy with value 1 if i and j are colonies at time t 
ComNat is a dummy with value 1 if i and j are part of the same nation at time t 
Regional is a dummy with value 1 if i and j belong to the same regional trade 
agreement at time t 




h ER }  is  the  set  of  dummy  variables  describing  the  exchange  rate  regime 
between i and j at time t, as set out in the next section 
{Tt} is a set of time fixed effects 
{Ci} is a set of country fixed effects. 
   
In order to build up towards this full model we first consider the introduction of country 
fixed effects as proxies for multilateral trade resistance. Table 1 presents, in columns 1 
and 2, the results of a basic regression of bilateral trade on log distance, log product of 
real GDP, log product of population, log product of area and time dummies, and with and 
without country fixed effects. It is clear that the fixed effects add significantly to the   9 
explanatory power of the equation: the pooling restriction on the country fixed effects is 
decisively rejected and the adjusted R-squared rises from 0.63 to 0.71. At the same time 
the coefficient estimate for log product of real GDP falls from 1.40 to 0.54 while that for 
log  distance  rises  (absolutely)  from  -1.36  to  -1.63.  On  the  other  hand,  since  the  log 
product of land area is perfectly collinear with the country fixed effects, it does not enter 
the regression in column 2.  In the light of this statistical evidence, as well as the previous 
theoretical argument, we include country fixed effects (and exclude land area) from now 
on.  
[Table 1 near here] 
 
In column 3 we introduce the standard set of controls used by Rose and others, i.e. those 
from Lang to GSP in the above list. It is clear that they also add to the explanatory power 
without greatly disturbing the other coefficients; the adjusted R-squared rises from 0.711 
to  0.721.  Those  variables  which  correlate  perfectly  with  the  country  fixed  effects, 
namely, Landl and Island are dropped from these and subsequent regressions.  
 
3  Adding exchange rate regimes 
We now build on this baseline by controlling for the exchange rate arrangements between 
countries, drawing primarily on Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) classification of de facto 
exchange rate regimes.
9 This is one of a number of classifications produced in recent 
years in attempts to discriminate between regimes on the basis of what countries actually 
do rather than what they say they do; it makes particular use of parallel market data as 
well as official exchange rate data.
10    10 
 
Reinhart and Rogoff classify most of the countries in our sample in terms of 15 different 
regimes,
11  and  we  have  filled  in  the  gaps  ourselves  for  the  others.
12  They  classify 
countries on an individual basis, but for use in a gravity model the classification has to be 
by country pairs. We are interested in distinguishing between exchange rate regimes in 
terms  of  exchange  rate  uncertainty  and  transactions  costs.  For  this  purpose  we  first 
aggregate Reinhart and Rogoff’s 15 categories into four: a currency union or currency 
board; a (hard) currency peg; a managed float; and a free float. This involves separating 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s second category (“currency board arrangement or pre-announced 
peg”) into hard pegs, such as the peg of sterling to the dollar between 1951 and 1971, and 
currency boards, such as those operated in many colonies, in Africa and elsewhere, prior 
to independence in the late 1950s or 1960s. In general the distinction is clearcut, but we 
had to make judgments about the transition from currency boards to hard pegs for a range 
of ex-colonies, and here we relied in part on information given in Page (1993). We were 
also able to allocate the very small number of cases of Reinhart and Rogoff’s category 15 
into  one  or  other  of  our four  categories.  Table  2  shows the  correspondence  between 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s 15 and our four categories. 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
Next, we define a vector of mutually exclusive 0-1 dummy variables so as to distinguish 
on a country pair basis between regimes such as (a) two countries use the same currency 
in a currency union and/or as the anchor for a currency board (dummy variable SAMECU 
= 1), in which case there is zero uncertainty and near-zero transactions costs involved in   11 
trade between them;
13 (b) two countries peg to the same currency (SAMEPEG = 1), in 
which case there is some uncertainty and definite transactions costs; (c) both countries’ 
exchange  rates  float  but  are  managed  with  reference  to  the  same  anchor  currency 
(SAMEMANREF =  1),  in which  case  there is more  uncertainty  and  probably  higher 
transactions costs (from wider spreads); (d) cases where one country has a pegged and 
another a managed currency (without a specific reference currency) (PEGMAN = 1); and 
so on. The matrix in Table 3 is a simple way of identifying the different possible regimes; 
in each of the cells in the first three rows there are two regimes to cover when countries 
refer (more or less strictly) to the same currency (in the north-west corner of the cell) and 
when they refer to different currencies (in the south-east corner). Table 4 gives the full 
specification, together with the distribution of observations across regimes. The default 
exchange rate regime is where both countries have a freely floating currency. 
[Tables 3 and 4 near here] 
 
As  for  our  prior  expectations  for  the  various  dummies,  on  the  basis  of  the  existing 
literature on the effect of currency unions within gravity models, we expect countries in 
the same currency union/currency board to have significantly higher trade than those in 
the default regime, so that SAMECU should be positive. We expect countries which peg 
to the same currency to have somewhat higher trade, ceteris paribus, since the exchange 
rate uncertainty is less than in the default regime but there are significant transactions 
costs,  so  that  SAMEPEG  should  be  positive  but  smaller  than  SAMECU.  We  expect 
countries which manage their currencies with reference to the same currency to have a   12 
smaller improvement in external trade, so that SAMEMANREF would be positive but 
smaller again.  
 
For exchange rate regimes which cross categories or involve different anchors, pegs or 
reference currencies, however, it is necessary to be more precise. In particular, we can 
distinguish three different effects. First, the direct effect of any exchange rate regime 
between two countries which reduces uncertainty and transactions costs relative to the 
default  regime  will  be  to  increase  the  trade  between  them.  Second,  there  will  be  a 
substitution effect: a regime may affect the trade between two countries negatively by 
encouraging one country to substitute it by trade with a third country with which it has a 
‘closer’ exchange rate regime. And third, there will be an indirect effect: a regime may 
affect trade positively via an indirect reduction in transactions costs, where a country 
which trades with more than one user of a single currency, or (to a lesser extent) more 
than one country pegging to a vehicle currency, can economise on working balances in 
the single or the vehicle currency.  
 
For example, where one country is in a currency union/currency board with an anchor to 
which the other pegs, the common anchor/peg should reduce uncertainty (relative to the 
default regime) and insofar as it trades with other members of the union the pegging 
country should be able to economise on working balances, both of which effects would 
increase trade; on the other hand, the country in the currency union may substitute trade 
with  its currency  union  partner(s)  instead  of  trade with the  same-peg  country,  which 
would  reduce  trade.  Thus,  with  positive  direct  and  indirect  effects  but  a  negative   13 
substitution effect, the sign of SAMECUPEG is not clear a priori. Similarly, where two 
countries peg to different currencies, the existence of pegs may enable both countries to 
economise on working balances in the vehicle currencies, but there may be substitution 
effects in favour of trade with same-peg countries. So, with a zero direct effect (because 
both anchor currencies are floating against each other), a positive indirect effect and a 
negative substitution effect, the sign of DIFFPEG is also not clear a priori. 
 
4  Results 
Table 5 presents the results of adding the full menu of exchange rate regimes to the 
model reported in the final column of Table 1. The coefficients on the control variables 
are  all  close  to  those  in  the  final  column  of  Table  1,  and  the  adjusted  R-squared  is 
unchanged at 0.721. 11 out of the 20 exchange rate regime coefficients are significant. 
The highest (and  most significant) coefficient is that for SAMECU, which at 0.79 is 
slightly lower than Rose and van Wincoop’s (2001) corresponding currency union result 
(of  0.86).  SAMECUPEG,  SAMECUMAN  and  SAMEPEG  all  have  significant 
coefficients, at 0.38, 0.24 and 0.08 respectively. DIFFCU is significant at 0.36, as are 
DIFFPEG, DIFFPEGMAN and DIFFMANREF,  at 0.09, 0.11 and 0.10. On the other 
hand  PEGMAN,  PEGFLOAT  and  CUFLOAT  are  significantly  negative,  with  values 
between -0.09and -0.13.
14  
[Table 5 near here] 
 
Table 6 provides an alternative way of looking at these results. It sets out the coefficient 
estimates in a matrix corresponding in part to that of Table 3. The columns indicate   14 
successive exchange rate regimes for one country, while the rows indicate successive 
regimes for the second, distinguishing between where the second country has the same 
currency or anchor or reference currency as the first, in the top three rows, and where it 
has a different anchor or reference, in the last three rows. The NO/man row is repeated so 
that the table fans out in a symmetrical way from the default regime. Scanning the table 
along one row or one column enables the reader to see the effect of varying one country’s 
regime while holding the other’s constant.  And scanning along the diagonal towards the 
CU/CU cell at the top right shows the effect of keeping both countries’ regimes the same 
but varying them both.
15 
[Table 6 near here] 
 
A number of clear patterns emerge from Table 6. First, from the CU column it is clear 
that SAMECU > SAMECUPEG > SAMECUMAN > 0 > CUFLOAT. In other words, 
except  in  the  case  where  the  other  currency  is  floating  there  is  no  significant  trade 
diversion from membership of a currency union, a result which has also been obtained in 
more general terms by other researchers, e.g. Micco et al. (2003). Hence, the direct and 
indirect effects significantly outweigh the substitution effect. Second, from rows 2 and 3 
of  the  table  it  is  clear  that  SAMECUPEG  >  SAMEPEG  and  SAMECUMAN  > 
SAMEPEGMAN, while from the peg column SAMEPEG > SAMEPEGMAN. Third, the 
patterns for regimes where the currency/anchor/reference are different are generally less 
clear  (but  the  significance  and  the  magnitude  of  the  estimates  are  typically  smaller).   
However, membership of different currency unions has a strong positive effect on trade,   15 
with DIFFCU nearly half as large as SAMECU, while DIFFPEG, DIFFMANREF and 
DIFFPEGMAN are also significantly positive. 
 
We have also carried out the same analysis for the period 1948-72, and for 1948-98 as a 
whole. The results (which are available from the authors on request) are broadly similar, 
with two main differences: the absolute size of the exchange rate regime coefficients is 
typically larger for 1948-72 than for 1973-98; and DIFFCU is insignificant in 1948-72. 
While there is obviously scope for more disaggregated work here, these differences seem 
to be explicable in terms of the reasons given above for focusing on the later period, and 
two further points are worth making. First, the reduction in the trade effects of exchange 
rate  regimes  in  the  later  period  tends  to  go  against  the  endogeneity  argument  (that 
countries with more trade choose ‘closer’ exchange rate regimes). Second, while Micco 
et al. (2003) interpreted the relatively small currency union effect which they found for 
the EMU countries as indicating that this effect is smaller for developed countries than 
for the developing countries which are prominent in Rose’s datasets, the present findings 
suggest that Micco et al. may also have been picking up a smaller effect because currency 
unions typically had a smaller impact in the later period. 
 
In general our results suggest that there is a graduated effect by which greater exchange 
rate fixity and lower transactions costs encourage trade. The effect of currency unions on 
trade, on which the literature has concentrated, turns out to be the strongest, but other 
regimes which imply more uncertainty and larger transactions costs than in a currency 
union,  but  less  than  in  the  default  regime  of  a  double  float,  also  promote  trade.  In   16 
addition,  the  possible  trade-diverting  effect  of  ‘closer’  exchange  rate  regimes  –  the 
second of the three effects identified above – seems to be outweighed by the two trade-
promoting effects. This is surely the obvious explanation for the positive and significant 
results for the DIFFCU regime: the direct effect of this regime (relative to the default) 
must be negative or zero at best (since the unions are floating against each other), the 
substitution effect on trade must be negative, but the indirect effect on transactions cost 
must  be  positive  and  could  be  large,  particularly  in  cases  where  the  two  unions  are 
themselves large and the two countries trade widely with members of the other union.  
 
 
5  The tariff equivalent of different currency barriers 
The previous two sections have presented a wealth of empirical results.  These can be 
conveniently  summarized  by  expressing  the  estimated  barrier  to  trade  represented  by 
each exchange rate arrangement in tariff equivalent terms, relative to the barrier-free case 
which is here represented by the same currency union category (SAMECU). From the 
log-linearised  version  of  equation (1)  the  estimated  coefficients  on  the exchange  rate 
dummy variables correspond to  ˆ ( 1)ln
h h
ij b s m = -  where 
h
ij m  is that part of the trade cost 
factor for trade between countries i and j associated with exchange rate regime h (see 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)). The tariff equivalent in percentage terms is then 
(
h
ij m -  1)*100.  Table  7  presents  the  calculations  based  on  the  estimated  coefficients 
reported in Tables 5 (and 6), on the basis of two different estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution, first ￿ = 5, which is used by Rose and van Wincoop (2001), and second ￿ =   17 
8, which seems to be the preferred estimate of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).  The 
results are arranged in the rank order of the coefficients..  
[Table 7 near here] 
 
The full barrier, given in the table by the default regime, is estimated at 21.9% for ￿ = 5 
and 12.0% for ￿ = 8; the former can be compared with Rose and van Wincoop’s 26%. 
These barriers are reduced by exchange rate regimes which restrict the volatility of the 
exchange  rate  between  two  countries  and/or  decrease  the  costs  of  international 
transactions. In the ￿ = 8 case, for example, the barrier is reduced to 10.8% where two 
countries peg to the same anchor, to 6.7% when they are each  members of different 
currency unions, and 6.3% when one is using in a currency union/currency board the 
currency to which the other is pegged. Some regimes constitute an even bigger obstacle 
to trade than the ‘full barrier’ implied by the double float (because their coefficients are 
negative, in some cases significantly so), notably those in which at least one country 
floats or manages its currency without a specific reference. The trade-weighted average 
tariff equivalent across the full range of exchange rate arrangements is 21.0% for ￿ = 5 
and 11.5% for ￿ = 8.  
 
These disaggregated estimates allow us to place Rose’s original estimate of the currency 
union effect and Rose and Wincoop’s estimate of the monetary barrier in context. In both 
cases  their  estimates  are  derived  from  an  exercise  in  which  only  the  currency  union 
exchange  rate  regime  is  identified,  and  the  default  includes  all  other  regimes.  Such 
estimates are often understood implicitly as applying to the adoption of a currency union   18 
from the starting point of any other exchange rate regime. But our work shows it is 
important to differentiate. For example, the move from EMS to EMU was a move from 
SAMEPEG to SAMECU for trade between the countries concerned, and on our overall 
results that move reduces the monetary barrier by 10.8% rather than the full 12.0% (for ￿ 
= 8). Similarly, for Denmark to move now from pegging to the euro (SAMECUPEG) to 
adopting the euro (SAMECU) would reduce the monetary barrier to its trade with the 
eurozone only by 6.3%.  
 
6  Conclusions 
In this paper we have integrated a full set of bilateral exchange rate regimes into an 
existing large dataset and used the ‘new’ version gravity model to estimate the size of the 
barriers  to  trade  represented  by  different  regimes.  The  basic  results  confirm  the 
importance  of  currency  unions  in  encouraging  trade  between  countries,  but  they  put 
Rose’s original results in context in two particular respects. First, they indicate that some 
regimes other than currency unions are also significantly more pro-trade than flexible 
exchange  rates:  there  is  a  graduated  positive  effect  on  trade  as  uncertainty  and 
transactions costs are reduced.  Moreover, the results suggest that in general the positive 
direct  and  indirect  effects  on  trade  of  such  reductions  outweigh  the  trade-diverting 
substitution effect. Second, the result that DIFFCU is large and positive suggests that the 
indirect  effect  from  being  able  to  economise  on  working  balances  is  particularly 
important. That in turn suggests that a substantial part of the ‘Rose effect’ comes from the 
indirect effect, which is even stronger for membership of the same currency union, and 
that may help to explain the size of the effect.    19 




1 A partial exception to the exclusive focus on currency unions is Fritz-Krockow and 
Jurzyk  (2004)  who  investigate  the  trade-enhancing  effects  of  fixed  pegs  as  well  as 
currency unions in a set of 24 Caribbean and Latin American countries. 
2 Together with many other researchers in this field, we are very grateful to Andrew Rose 
for making his datasets available for download from his website. We are also grateful to 
Jacques Mélitz for making available his data on distance. 
3 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) define the left hand side variable as the exports from 
one country to the other, but as Mélitz (2003) points out there is nothing to distinguish 
between exports and imports. 
4  These  price  indices  are  crucially  absent  from  the  traditional  version  of  the  gravity 
equation,  and  the  implied  adjustments  to  them  are  essential  for  obtaining  proper 
predictions of the effects of changes in exchange rate regimes. 
5 In the case of domestic trade it is assumed that the trade cost factor, e.g. tjj, is equal to 
unity. 
6 See also Feenstra (2004, pp. 161-2): ‘Since the fixed-effects method produces consistent 
estimates of the average border effect across countries, and is easy to implement, it might 
be considered to be the preferred estimator.’ 
7 The main sources for the data are IMF and World Bank publications and the CIA’s 
World Factbook. See Rose (2003) for further details.  
8 The dataset consists of actual trade flows  and is therefore unbalanced: for example 
almost 8,000 pair-wise trade flows are recorded in 1997 but only 5,300 in 1973. 
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9 In programming the dataset we draw on Reinhart and Rogoff’s background material 
(2003a,  Part  I)  which  specifies  the  reference  currencies,  as  well  as  on  their  basic 
classification codes. 
10 See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) and Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault (2003) for 
alternative classifications. 
11 Monthly data is provided in Reinhart and Rogoff (2003b). 
12  Countries  not  covered  in  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  but  included  in  the  dataset  are: 
Afghanistan,  Angola,  Aruba,  Bahamas,  Bahrain,  Bangladesh,  Barbados,  Belize, 
Bermuda, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Comoros,  Djibouti, Fiji,  Kiribati, 
Maldives, Mozambique, Namibia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, 
Sao Tome, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tonga, 
Trinidad  and  Tobago,  United  Arab  Emirates,  Vanuatu,  Vietnam,  Yemen,  Zimbabwe 
(before  1980).  We  used  individual  country  webpages  and  world  exchange  rate 
arrangements  tables  from  the  IMF’s  website,  supplemented  by  examination  of  basic 
exchange rate data and common knowledge. 
13 It should be noted that the SAMECU variable differs from Rose’s strict currency union 
dummy insofar as (a) SAMECU is 1 but Rose’s custrict is 0 where two countries each 
have (institutionally separate) currency unions or currency board arrangements with the 
same anchor currency, eg Argentina and Hong Kong in the 1990s, and (b) SAMECU is 0 
and  custrict  is  1  in  some  post-independence  years  when,  according  to  Reinhart  and 
Rogoff and other sources, some of the  colonial currency board arrangements became 
pegs rather than currency boards. 
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14 It should be noted that the very large number of observations means that it is in some 
sense ‘easy’ for a variable to appear statistically significant in this exercise. What matters 
is the absolute size of the currency effects. 
15 In this paragraph we have focused on the point estimates, but, as can be inferred from 
Table 5, all the differences mentioned are statistically significant except for those 
between SAMECUPEG and SAMECUMAN and between SAMEPEG and 
SAMEPEGMAN   23 
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Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)

















log product real GDP 1.40 0.54 0.54
[344.15] [34.87] [35.48]
log product population  -0.44 -0.43 -0.41
[90.48] [12.12] [11.64]
log product area   -0.11 - -
[44.02]
log distance -1.36 -1.63 -1.46
[203.52] [209.15] [164.32]
Common language - - 0.34
[20.33]
Common Border - - 0.48
[14.55]
Common colonizer post 1945 - - 0.64
[24.48]




Members of common nation - - 0.55
[1.90]
Regional Trade Arrangement - - 1.31
[33.34]
GSP  - - 0.60
[37.30]
year dummies Yes Yes Yes
country dummies No Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.627 0.711 0.721
F[Country effects=0] [2]  - 187.96 186.05
[0.000] [0.000]
No. observations 164,654 164,654 164,654
Notes: [1] heteroscedastic robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
[2] F-test against joint significance of country dummies.  27 
Table 2: Classification of exchange rate regimes 
R&R fine code  R&R description  New classification 
1  No separate legal tender 
2  Currency board arrangement or 
Currency board or currency 
union 
2  Pre-announced peg 
3  Pre-announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2% 




5  Pre-announced crawling peg 
6  Pre-announced crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
7  De facto crawling peg 
8  De fact crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2% 
9  Pre-announced crawling band that is 
wider than or equal to +/-2% 
10  De facto crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-5% 
11  Moving band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-2% (i.e. allows for both 
appreciation and depreciation over time) 









13  Freely floating 
14  Freely falling 
Flexible exchange rate 
15  Dual market in which parallel market 
data is missing 
[allocated elsewhere] 
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004); text. 
   28 
Table 3: Matrix of exchange rate regimes by country pair 
  currency  union  or 
currency board 
pegged exchange rate  managed exchange 
rate with specified 
reference currency 
managed exchange 
rate with no specified 
reference currency 
flexible exchange rate 
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Table 4: Classification and distribution of exchange rate regimes by country pair 
Description of exchange rate regime by country pair  Dummy variable  Percent  of 
Total 
both  countries  use  the  same  currency  in  a  currency 
union and/or as the anchor for a currency board 
SAMECU  1.5 
both  countries  are  in  currency  unions  or  operate 
currency boards, but with different anchors 
DIFFCU  0.7 
one country is in a currency union/currency board with 
an anchor to which the other pegs 
SAMECUPEG  1.2 
one country is in currency union/currency board with 
one anchor while the other pegs to different anchor 
DIFFCUPEG  2.0 
both countries peg to the same currency  SAMEPEG  2.1 
both countries peg but to different anchors  DIFFPEG  1.2 
one  currency  is  in  currency  union/board  with  anchor 
with reference to which the other is managed 
SAMECUMAN  3.9 
one  currency  is  in  currency  union/board  with  anchor 
other  than  that  with  reference  to  which  the  other  is 
managed 
DIFFCUMAN  7.4 
one country is pegged to the currency with reference to 
which the other’s currency is managed 
SAMEPEGMAN  6.8 
one country is pegged to a currency other than that with 
reference to which the other’s is managed 
DIFFPEGMAN  5.1 
both  countries  have  managed  floats  with  the  same 
reference currency 
SAMEMANREF  8.9 
both countries have managed floats with specified but 
different reference currencies 
DIFFMANREF  8.0 
one country is in currency union/board, the other has a 
managed float with no specified reference currency 
CUMAN  3.6 
one country pegs, the other has a managed float with no 
specified reference currency 
PEGMAN  3.0 
both countries have managed floats, one with and one 
without a specified reference currency 
MANREFMAN  11.0 
both countries have managed floats, with unspecified 
reference currencies 
MANMAN  1.9 
one country is in a currency union/currency board, the 
other has a floating currency 
CUFLOAT  4.1 
one country pegs, the other has a floating currency  PEGFLOAT  4.6 
one country is managing its currency with a specific 
reference, the other has a floating currency 
MANREFFLOAT  12.3 
one country is managing its currency without a specific 
reference, the other has a floating currency 
MANFLOAT  3.7 
both countries have a flexible exchange rate  [default regime]  7.1 
Total Observations    164,654 
 Table 5: Exchange Rate Arrangements and Trade
Dependent Variable: Log bilateral trade (constant US dollars)
Estimation: Pooled OLS with country and time dummies
Sample
Coefficient t-statistic[2]






















log distance -1.445 -158.68
log product real GDP 0.537 35.08
log product population -0.406 -11.29
Common language post 1945 0.312 18.75
Common border 0.485 14.90
Common colonizer  0.587 22.34
Current colony 0.356 1.85
Ever colony 1.185 45.59
Members of common nation 0.685 2.43
Regional Trade Arrangement 1.285 32.37




No. obs 164,654      
Notes:  
[1] See Table 4 for definition of exchange rate arrangements
[2] heteroscedastic robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
1973-1998  31 
Table 6: Exchange rate regime coefficients 1973-98 
 
  Country 1 Exchange Rate Arrangement 
  row    flex  man  ref  peg  CU 
1  CU          0.79* 
2  peg        0.08*  0.38* 
 
SAME 
3  ref      0.01  -0.03  0.24* 
4  man    -0.01  0.05  -0.09*  0.07 
5  flex  0  -0.05  -0.04  -0.13*  -0.12* 
 
NO 
  6  man    -0.01  0.05  -0.09*  0.07 
7  ref      0.10*  0.11*  0.05 









































9  CU          0.36* 
 
Key: SAME = both countries have same currency/anchor/reference; DIFF = each country has different 
currency/anchor/reference; NO = no anchor/reference; CU = currency union/currency board; peg = pegged 
exchange rate; ref = managed exchange rate with specific reference; man = managed with no specific 
reference; flex = flexible exchange rate. 
 























Weighted Average [2] 20.98 11.47
Notes:
[1] Tariff equivalent calculations based on estimated coefficients from Table 5
[2] Computed by weighting each tariff-equivalent by the share of trade sustained
under each exchange rate regime.
1973-98